"Anti-Semitism in Context"
Excerpt from Ackerman, Nathan W. and Jahoda, Marie, “Anti- Semitism in Context,” Anti- Semitism and Emotional Disorder: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950). Adapted and reprinted with permission from Anti- Semitism and Emotional Disorder: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation, by Nathan W. Ackerman and Marie Jahoda (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1950)
Throughout the preceding discussion, one question, implicitly raised at several points, has remained unanswered. Given these emotional predispositions and their history, this pattern of defense mechanisms and their interaction with cultural factors–is anti-Semitism then inevitable? In other words, is anti-Semitism as a particular hostility pattern specifically determined by this complex of factors?
No simple “yes” or “no” answer can be given. The evidence has led to the conclusion that psychological specificity is a relative factor; in the case of some anti-Semitic personalities it is high, in others low. The anti-Semitic reaction was highly specific, for example, in the case of the person (Case 11) who hated Jews because he saw them combining success with a happy emotional life. Color prejudice would not have fulfilled as well the same emotional function.
Specificity of a somewhat lesser degree existed in the case of the white-collar worker (Case 29) whose hatred of the Jews was an expression of his feeble rebellion against authority and his own economically underprivileged status. The pseudo-liberal (Case 18), on the other hand, whose occasional outbursts of anti-Semitism were based on his identification with the underdog whom he rejected along with himself, might well have selected the Negro for the same purpose of projection. Underdog identification, however, is not necessarily unspecific. The patient (Case 2) whose anti-Semitism contained the element of identification with a Jewish victim, was particularly incensed by encountering Jews in positions of authority. That he himself had betrayed the identification with the underdog mattered little compared to the Jewish “betrayal” in escaping the underdog position and assuming a position of power. The chances are that in the American culture no other target group of hatred and prejudice could have provided him with these two significant experiences.
Finally, the least degree of specificity was met in those for whom anti-Semitism primarily served the function of emphasizing “difference” per se. The sixteen year old boy, for whom “Jew” was synonymous with name calling, could easily have substituted any other prejudice for anti-Semitism.
The psychological specificity of anti-Semitism thus varies from case to case. That is why an attempt must be made to broaden the context of the problem, to regard the wider implications of anti-Semitism along with its relation to other disturbances of group living and other social ills. For despite its historical uniqueness, the selection of anti-Semitism–- from the psychodynamic point of view–-is in several instances a more or less accidental manifestation of the prejudiced person’s deficiencies. Anti-Semitism may occasionally be due to a historical accident in individual cases, independent of the relative degree of emotional specificity; but the disturbance in intergroup relations in such persons appears to be psychologically determined.
A psychologically comprehensive description of attitudes in intergroup relations demands consideration of four dimensions. If members of group A and group B are interacting (say, Jews and Gentiles) these dimensions are: the attitude of a member of group A to group A and group B; the attitude of a member of group B to group B and group A. In the case of anti-Semitism, disturbances occur not only in the attitude of Gentiles to Jews and Jews to Gentiles, but also in the attitude of each to his own group. As we have demonstrated, the concept of self is continuously modified by one’s own group and, in turn, the group is modified by the concept of self of its members, which finds expression in the relation to other groups.
While the suffering of the Jew as a victim is of a special brand, it is not only he who suffers. As our case studies have shown, the anti-Semite also suffers. Jew and Gentile, when they are driven by insecurity in themselves, resort to irrational hostility against outgroups. Thus, disturbances in each of these four dimensions in intergroup relations are ubiquitous in modern society.
The question then arises, Which factors in society, interacting with intrapsychic anxiety, contribute to such disturbances and the concomitant suffering? Otto Fenichel has posed this question in his article A psychoanalytic approach to anti-Semitism. Having stated that in Germany the Jewish separateness from the native culture and the discontent of the masses formed a complementary series which produced anti-Semitism on a large scale, he goes on to say:
But what about the United States? At first glance, one may perhaps assume that here the complementary series is reverse in structure. There is no general revolutionary mood, and at least in some parts of the United States, traditional Jewish life is practiced by many. However, Jewish peculiarities have certainly not increased recently, whereas anti-Semitism has. Does this mean that there is actually a mass discontent comparable to the discontent in pre-Hitler Germany? It seems as if our theory of anti-Semitism compels us to assume something of the kind. In a certain sense, something of “mass discontent” must be present; the question is, in what sense? . . .
Fenichel leaves this question open. To answer it comprehensively would demand a detailed critique of these times for which we have neither the qualifications nor the space.
All we can do is to refer again to our material and examine it once more from a new angle. Assuming, in order to limit unfounded speculation as much as possible, that our forty case histories are the only available source of information about American culture, what general deductions about the discontent in this culture can we make? The picture will be sketchy and one-sided, but it remains the best approach available in the context of this study toward finding an answer to such a question.
It appears that the most outstanding feature of the culture as seen in the lives of these patients is its intense economic and social competitiveness. An indication of this competitiveness is contained in the content of the anti-Semitic stereotype. There are but a very few cases in which economic and social status qualities are not attributed to Jews: “low class, inferior, not belonging to good society,” or “powerful, superior, exploiters, pushers, social climbers.” These and other accusations, whether they express rejection or envy of the Jew, are all modeled according to the competitive world in which these people live.
But there are further indications of the pressure for economic success. Most of the mothers of our cases–so far as we know about them–- apparently did not tell their children “be happy” but rather: “make money,” “outdo your father,” “get a good job.”
The mother of one man (Case 22) spurred all her children on to scholastic achievement in order to acquire eventual material success and to become better providers than their father. Another mother was snobbish and ever critical of her husband for being unambitious and making a poor living. Since she could not succeed in pushing him she wanted her son (Case 9) to become a person of wealth and social prestige. One patient (Case 1), as will be remembered, was driven from one profession to another by her desperate longing to achieve social security.
It is the essence of competitiveness that success is measured by comparison with others rather than by actual achievement. That is why a strongly competitive society gives permanent cause for social anxiety to everyone, even to those who have achieved material success. There are always some who have done better, who have more money and more social prestige; and there is always the danger of being pushed down the social ladder by a competitor.
For some of the social-service agency cases, the economic anxiety was realistically justified. Lack of food in some cases, crowded living quarters and continuous quarrels between the parents about money are the normal background factors that strengthen the importance of economic success as a goal in life. But the social anxiety in this competitive culture caught hold even of the economically privileged. Indeed they are often much more vulnerable to competitive anxiety because of their extreme concern with money; why they have it, they live in constant dread of losing it.
One man (Case 10), who had inherited so much money that he never did a stroke of work, was plagued by fear that he would lose his money and was quite convinced that whatever pleasures he could get out of life were in direct proportion to the money he paid for them. A woman (Case 3), who to all appearances was a highly successful business woman, was continuously worried about losing her position. Another (Case 4) was unable to work unless she felt she was at the top of a hierarchy, and a third (Case 30), who had made a remarkable ascent from utter poverty to a position of comfort, always felt insecure in her achievement. A fourth woman (Case 12), who came from a wealthy family, expressed her insatiable status drive by attempts to get into the circles of French and British aristocracy.
Where economic gain or social status become the only yardstick for success, acquisition of money is a virtue, poverty a crime. The acquisitive society is reflected in the patients’ attitudes toward money in the analytic situation. Several analysts reported that their patients quibbled over analytic fees despite their highly privileged economic situation. Their material acquisitions, however, must be displayed to the world as a sign of success, so that others should be driven to comparison and to realize their own inferiority. Many patients seem to combine two contradictory trends in our culture: the trend for acquisition and the trend for conspicuous consumption. This was particularly evident for the man (Case 9) who cheated his newspaper man out of small change but at the same time felt compelled to give expensive banquets to his business friends.
Even where generosity appears in these cases–which does not happen too frequently–it was motivated by the same desire for conspicuous consumption that would prove to others that the individual was not a failure.
To regard poverty as a crime and as a sign of degradation is a natural correlate in a society that considers money a virtue. One woman (Case 4) was convinced that poor people and laborers get their support to a large extent from stealing the pocketbooks of the “better” people.
Inherent in the competitive and acquisitive features of society, with its concomitant social insecurity, is a progressive alienation from the satisfactions of work. This problem has often been presented as the curse of mass production for factory workers. Judging from our cases this process of alienation is by no means restricted to monotonous work, because a large proportion of these professional people and business executives are as alienated from their work as if they stood at a conveyor belt. As a matter of fact, with one exception (Case 18) none derive any satisfaction from their actual work performance. The cultural climate is such that no importance is attached to what is being done, but rather the importance arises from how much one makes out of it.
The atomization of man, judging from the social life of these patients, is highly advanced in this society. Individuals are isolated; families are isolated. There does not seem to exist a meaningful group belongingness, unless it is organized around an issue of social prestige. The country club fulfills such a function, but a function without positive content.
There is, to be sure, an urge for group cohesion. But the culture places no premium on the realization of such an urge. If the deep loneliness of people in this society were in some way to be overcome, this achievement, apparently, would be considered of small consequence. It is little wonder that the father of one patient (Case 3) is reported to have had the best time of his life while serving in the army during the First World War, for there he found purpose and companionship. Two other patients joined the Communist Party, not because they shared its ideology, but because they were drawn by its promise of group cohesion and purposefulness.
These persons have learned from their work-life that to know other people as human beings is of no profit. Spontaneous friendliness is hamstrung by the fact and the fear of exploitation, and human relations are consequently evaluated according to their utility. Thus society debases friendship for its own sake, and debases group membership for any purpose but prestige or utility. So much is this the case that one man (Case 31), who was himself conservative and anti-union, worked during an election campaign for a liberal politician because this was the best way to meet the “right people.”
The culture induced premium on knowing the “right people” is already considerable by the time of school and college age. Several patients reported bitter childhood memories of having been ostracized by the “right” clique in school, and of desperate struggles to get into the proper fraternities and college circles. The realistic importance of good connections in our society intensifies the atomization of man. The “right” people are distrustful of others because they know that ulterior motives lie back of much of the “friendliness” directed toward them. The one who seeks their company for such ulterior motives is so purpose-bound on his ascent up the success ladder that he becomes insensitive to the personal qualities of those whom he wishes to use as tools. The isolation of the individual is the result of regarding friendship as a means to security and money rather than as an end in itself.
There is, in this society, a lack of capacity for relaxation, pleasure, or the creative use of leisure time. Fundamentally, all these people are “bored” by what is going on around them, unless they can set it into a relation to their own success strivings. This boredom is, indeed, a symptom of their deep anxiety. All activity becomes patterned by the need to control this anxiety, which emerges in part from unconscious self-hatred. So preoccupied are they with this driven activity, that they lose the capacity to enjoy themselves. To be interested in something for its own sake appears a waste of time, however heavily free time presses on such empty lives.
Social and political events are, as a rule, too far removed from the sphere of possible personal gain to arouse these persons from their apathy. The war was considered a “bore” by one patient, an “annoyance” by another. One woman who joined a Red Cross sewing club during the war explained that she did so because “it is done in my circle.” Roosevelt’s death elicited the following comment from one patient: “I cannot feel sorry for a man who gave office to Jews like Miss Perkins.” The comment is noteworthy for the level of interest in the country’s affairs that it manifests, as much as for the level of misinformation that it reveals. The culture presses these people into a selective perception of reality–in this case, into distorted perception through its emphasis on individual gain as the highest goal.
The secularization of society is apparently increasing rapidly. Many of the patients were brought up by parents whose lives were geared to religious concepts and practices, but hardly one of the second generation whom we have studied had a genuine religious feeling. Religious guidance no longer plays its traditional role of providing stable values and standards for behavior. Instead, adherence to a religious group is motived by status purposes. This is most obvious in the few cases of religious conversion, but it also manifests itself in those who continue their parental religious affiliations. One man (Case 2), for example, whose parents were members of a small religious sect, used his formal adherence to this sect in order to get a job, although he had no religious feelings at all.
Apparently, no system of ethics and values has taken the place left empty by the decline of genuine religiousness. Power, success, money, conventionality, and conformity are the only value concepts applied by these patients to judge themselves and others. The respect for the individual and his soul, so deeply anchored in Judaism and Christianity, has disappeared as a value, without a replacement.
All these trends are reflected, as they must be, in the functioning of the family, the basic unit of society. The lack of warm family feeling has already been mentioned in a different context. The rift is manifested in other ways as well. The concept of married love is occasionally still maintained as an illusion. More frequently, it is replaced by the idea of a hard social and economic contract, a marriage for convenience or prestige. The unmarried women patients all want to get married because of the increased social status, if not the economic standards of married women. A woman (Case 4), who went into analysis because she was unable to get married, explained that she suffered from the fact that all her girl friends had husbands. A man (Case 9) married a Jewish woman, in spite of his anti-Semitism, because he expected her to be a good housekeeper who would help save money.
The position of a woman in this society seems to be curiously ambiguous. In spite of the fact that in many of the marriages in our cases the woman actually dominates the relationship, the concept that this is a male world is kept up even by these domineering women. Most of the women patients suffered from their parents’ preference for boys, and yearned desperately in their youth to be men. Their professional life compels them to compete with men on “male” issues. Being mothers and wives contains meaning only insofar as sons and husbands can be expected to provide the vicarious experience of male success. This is of special interest in view of the evidence in some cases of an identification between femaleness and Jewishness.
Thus the relationship between the sexes manifests the pattern that underlies most of these trends: domination-submission. Theirs is a world in which the concept of cooperation and equality does not exist. Unless they dominate, they are crushed.
This, then, is the answer to Fenichel's question as to the nature of the mass discontent which disturbs intergroup relations in American society. It does not paint a hopeful picture. In spite of its admittedly one-sided source, there are too many indications that these features of our culture indeed exist as powerful trends. They cannot be brushed aside as the distorted experiences of our highly selected cases.
There are, however, other forces at work counteracting the discontent produced by these trends. The American dilemma, as Gunnar Myrdal described it, is still a dilemma. It would be futile to seek in our material for manifestations of these positive trends. Nevertheless, we know from daily struggle and experience that they exist. People still can cooperate, respect the individual, strive for non-material purposes, voluntarily forego economic gain, have friends, be happily married, experience deep satisfaction in groups and in their work, give themselves to creative leisure occupations, maintain genuine religious feelings, or substitute high ethical values where religion has lost its meaning.
The psychodynamic study of the unprejudiced person-–a challenge to research that has not yet been met–-would indicate those trends in the cultural climate which currently counteract destructive forces. It might even reveal that some individuals live as human beings, in spite of social forces that overwhelmingly manipulate most people. For manipulation it remains, even when applied in the interest of a good cause. Perhaps we might discover that some among us have been able to make that famous jump from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.
All we can do here is to express our conviction that the case is not lost–-not yet. Seen in the context of this cultural struggle, the fight against anti-Semitism is, therefore, more than a fight for the rights of Jews, or of Negroes, Catholics, Mexicans, Japanese-Americans and others who with benefits to none often replace the Jewish victim. It is more than a fight for the liberation of the prejudiced person whose thwarted personality makes him insensitive to the joys of life. It is a fight for the very survival of civilized mankind.